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Abstract
The Child Support Grant (CSG) represents one of the major cash transfer implemented in South Africa
to address children’s vulnerability and household poverty. This paper provides an evaluation of the impact
of the CSG on gender inequality by evaluating the eﬀect of the programme on the employment status
of adult members of beneﬁciary households. We use data from the 2008, 2010-2011 and 2012 National
Income Dynamics Study and apply a fuzzy regression discontinuity design that exploits the expansion in
eligibility due to a discontinous change in the age eligibility criterion. The analysis considers two source of
heterogeneity in the impact of the CSG on labour market, i.e. gender and household members receiving the
Old Age Pension social grant. In addition, the evaluation identiﬁes diﬀering eﬀects by number of treated
children in beneﬁciary households. Overall, this evaluation shows that the CSG had a negative eﬀect on
the probability of being employed of the beneﬁciary household members and increased gender inequality by
strongly discouraging women’s employment.
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1. Introduction
The Child Support Grant (CSG) is a cash transfer introduced in South Africa in 1998 to support vulnera-
ble children and their households and represents one of the main instrument of the national social protection
strategy to address poverty and inequality (Barrientos et al., 2014; Devereux, 2011; Nin˜o-Zarazu´a et al.,
2012). The grant is an unconditional monthly transfer given to up to six children per household, and is paid
to their caregivers who, in most cases, are mothers and other women of the households (Agu¨ero et al., 2007).
The recipients are qualiﬁed on the basis of a means test with an income threshold amounting to ten
times the monthly grant per child if they are single caregivers, and twenty if they are married1. In addition,
at the start the program included children under 7 and then the eligible child age gradually increased. By
2010, eligibility underwent a sharp change: children born before January 1 1994 were eligible up to age 14
whereas those born after this date gained eligibility up to age 18 (Agu¨ero et al., 2007; Bor, 2013; Woolard
et al., 2011).
A number of studies evaluated the impact of the programme on diﬀering dimensions of the well-being of
children and their families and generally found positive results (d’Agostino et al., 2016; Woolard et al., 2011),
but there is still little evidence on the eﬀect of the CSG from the perspective of gender equality. This issue is
of great importance because, despite the government’s commitment to this objective, women discrimination,
especially for African women, is a persistent probem in South Africa - for several reasons (Goldblatt, 2005;
Patel and Hochfeld, 2011; Patel, 2012). In more detail, family disruption caused by apartheid economy
still shapes African families’ pattern: the majority of children live apart from their biological fathers and
principally adult women provide care for childbearing and other duties (Budlender and Lund, 2011). In
addition, women are increasingly working in paid employment, but they are overrepresented among low-
wage workers and self-employed and diﬀerences in the employment rates between men and women are large
and persistent (Posel and Rogan, 2009)2.
Although the link between social grants and gender equality is complex and concerns several aspects, in
the South African context, characterised by high rate of unemployment and earnings inequality, the most
prominent issue is represented by the impact of social grants on labour market. In general, there are good
reasons to believe that cash transfer programmes can aﬀect household decision making, including labour
supply. In the case of the CSG, most beneﬁciaries live in rural areas and face signiﬁcant barriers that block
their access to multiple markets, such as credit and labour (Kingdon and Knight, 2004). Hence CTs, when
provided in a regular fashion, may help households overcome these obstacle (Asfaw et al., 2014). In addition,
in 2014 the CSG total amount per household ranged between R320 for households with one eligible child
to R1,920 for households with six children. Given that in the same year the median monthly earning was
R3,033 (R2,800 for the subgroup of black Africans, who are more likely to be poor and eligible for the
programme) (StatSa (Statistics South Africa), 2015), the grant represents a signiﬁcant income source for
beneﬁciary families.
From a theoretical point of view, the impact of cash transfers targeting children on women’s labour
supply decision is ambiguous. The grant could disincentivise women’s participation in the labour market by
enhancing the value of time dedicated to housework activities, relative to time dedicated to paid work (i.e.
income eﬀect) (Asfaw et al. 2014). The grant can thus increase their reservation wage and create ’grant
dependency’ (Molyneux, 2009; Williams, 2007). The disincentive eﬀect is even stronger when the programme
selects beneﬁciary families with a stringent means test, making work unproﬁtable when earnings are close to
the income threshold (Leibbrandt et al., 2013; Williams, 2007). The income eﬀect can also aﬀect the labour
supply decision of men, increasing their time dedicated to leisure, but it is expected that cultural norms
and constraints of caring for children produce more pronounced eﬀects on women. As a consequence, cash
transfers may reinforce women’s role as mothers with primary responsibility for family cares (Goldblatt,
2005; Molyneux, 2009; Patel, 2012).
1The grant was ﬁxed at a level of R100 per month for each beneﬁciary child in 1998 and rose over years reaching R320 per
month for each child in 2014. From 2008 onwards, the amount is adjusted every year to inﬂation(Agu¨ero et al., 2007; Woolard
et al., 2011).
2In 2014 the unemployment rate was 27.2% for women and 23,3% for men. According to the broad deﬁnition of unemployed,
which includes the discouraged work-seekers, it was even higher, rising to 39.0% and 32.1%, for women and men respectively
(StatSa (Statistics South Africa), 2015).
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However, we may also expect opposite eﬀects on women’s labour market status: the grant improves their
empowerment (Patel, 2012) and relax liquidity constraints, providing a ﬁnancial support to reducing the
burden of care and to enhancing job search or self-employment (Leibbrandt et al., 2013; Patel et al., 2013;
Williams, 2007). Similarly, in the long-run the grant helps improving women’s human capital, with a positive
eﬀect on their employment perspectives (Leibbrandt et al., 2013).
There is limited empirical evidence on the impact of the CSG on women’s employment and, generally,
it showed positive results. Williams (2007) found that the program increased labour force participation
and employment rates in grant-receiving households, with a stronger eﬀect for women. Similarly, Eyal and
Woolard (2011) found that the CSG signiﬁcantly increased the probability of being employed of the recipient
mothers. Both studies explain these positive eﬀects on women employment with the fact that the grant helps
funding child care costs, allowing mothers to entering the workplace. In contrast, there is robust evidence on
the Old Age Pension (OAP), the other large-scale social grant implemented in South Africa, showing that
pensions had mixed results on possible perverse labour market incentives (Ardington et al., 2009; Devereux,
2013; Leibbrandt et al., 2013; Williams, 2007; Banerjee et al., 2008). However, the transmission channel
of the impact in this case is diﬀerent because the OAP targets people who generally are out of the labour
force, and thus it inﬂuences only intra-household labour allocation, whereas the CSG provides cash to adult
of working age, producing both a direct eﬀect on recipients, and indirect eﬀect on other household members
(Williams, 2007).
It is also important to stress that, to our knowledge, no existing evaluation explicitly considers the eﬀect
on labour market outcomes of the joint receipt of the CSG and OAP by the same household. However, this
eﬀect must be rigorously taken into account as eligibility for the CSG depends on the income test which only
includes the income of primary caregivers and her/his spouse (Woolard and Leibbrandt, 2013). Hence, it is
possible that the CSG beneﬁts are paid to household members with relatives receiving the OAP and that
the cumulative impact of these transfers at household level ampliﬁes the dependence eﬀect on beneﬁciaries
in working age.
This paper contributes to the previous literature by providing a rigorous evaluation of the impact of the
CSG on the employment status of the adult household members to assess whether it produces a heterogeneous
impact by gender in the labour market. Using the dataset provided by the National Income Dynamics Study
(NIDS) covering 2008, 2010-2011 and 2012, we carry out a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) that
exploits the variation due to the extension in child age eligibility. This policy change created a discontinuous
increase in the probability of being CSG beneﬁciary for children in the age interval 14-17 born after January
1 1994 and provides us the identiﬁcation structure for the analysis. Following Calonico et al. (2014) and
Cattaneo et al. (2015), we analyse the goodness of the identiﬁcation structure through the non-parametric
local polynomial (LP) estimator.
We then estimate the eﬀect of the CSG by using the parametric instrumental variable (IV) approach. In
more detail, we run IV regressions to estimate the local average treatment eﬀects (LATE) (Lee, 2008; Lee
and Lemieux, 2010; Jacob et al., 2012). As more than one child (and up to six) can beneﬁt from the CSG
in the same household, we also evaluate how the eﬀect changes when the number of beneﬁciary children
increases, producing diﬀering degree of exposure to the programme.
In addition, we consider two source of heterogeneity of treatment across units of observation, depending
on gender and on the fact that eﬀects change when members receiving the CSG and OAP live in the same
household, increasing the total household income obtained from social grants. To capture heterogeneity
across units due to gender and OAP social grants, we follow the approach proposed by Becker et al. (2013)
to estimate the heterogeneous local average treatment eﬀects (HLATE). Lastly, robustness analysis is applied
to provide further checks on the internal and external validity of the fuzzy RDD by comparing the results
obtained through the IV estimator with those obtained through the two-step propensity score (PS) procedure
(van der Klaauw, 2002) and inverse distance weight (IDW) estimator3.
Our main ﬁnding is that the CSG had a negative eﬀect on the probability of being employed for the
adult members of beneﬁciary households and this eﬀect worsened for household members with more than
one beneﬁciary child. In other words, this evaluation shows that the CSG created dependence of working-
age adults on the transfers. In addition, the negative impact on the probability of being employed was
3For an extensive discussion on the use of the PS and IDW estimators, see d’Agostino et al. (2016)
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especially strong for women and for members of households receiving both the CSG and OAP. Our analysis
also shows that the reduction in the probability of being employed for both women and men only partially
resulted in an increase of the probability of being searching unemployed whereas it was in large part balanced
by an increase in the probability of being out of labour force (i.e., Not Economically Active, NEA). The
increase in the probability of being in the out-of-labour-force state involved mainly women aged from 31 to
55 and men from 46 to 50, thereby aﬀecting the potentially most productive persons in the total working age
population. Overall, this evaluation shows that the CSG had a negative eﬀect on employment opportunities
of the beneﬁciary household members and increased gender inequality by strongly discouraging women’s
employment.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the dataset and descriptive statistics; Section
3 presents some preliminary analyses; Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 shwos the robustness
analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data and descriptive statistics
As mentioned in Section 1, the CSG beneﬁts are provided to eligible beneﬁciaries according to a means
test and child age4. From January 1 2010, age eligibility was extended, so that children born after January
1 1994 were eligible until their 18th birthday, whereas those born before that date lost eligibility at 14. The
discontinuity in the age eligibility criterion provides a clear-cut natural experiment to be carried out by
applying a fuzzy RDD and looking at the causal eﬀects of the CSG across birth cohorts.
The empirical analysis is based on the datased provided from the National Income Dynamic Study (NIDS)
which was implemented by the South African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) of the
University of Cape Town. The NIDS was available for the waves 2008, 2010-2011 and 2012, and allowed a
face-to-face longitudinal survey of households resident in South Africa. Its aim was to follow a sample of
household members and register changes in household compositions and migrations and several dimensions
of well-being (e.g., incomes, expenditures, assets, access to social services, education, health, employment).
The dataset also includes informations on the beneﬁciary households of the social grants provided by the
government.
From the dataset we extract relevant informations related to the annual birth cohort of children born in
the period 1990-2009, in a corresponding age range of 0-17 years and link this information to each adult of
the household in the working age (from 15 to 64 years). We drop from the sample all the birth cohorts of
children before 1990 since they are never eligible for the CSG and exclude the birth cohorts of 2010, 2011
and 2012 because the information on these cohorts is available only in the last waves. As the grant is given
for each beneﬁciary child up to a maximum of six children, the identiﬁcation has to account for diﬀering
degrees of exposure to the policy within the same household and for each individual. To account for these
diﬀerences, we use the information on each treated child in its birth cohort for each adult in the beneﬁciary
household. This procedure generates six dataset to be compared with the control group. However, to ensure
an easy reading of the results, in the empirical analysis we aggregate the number of beneﬁciary children in
four diﬀerent categories: i) one treated child, ii) two treated children, iii) three and four treated children and
iv) ﬁve or six treated children.
From the dataset we extract informations on several variables related to the labour market, and classify
working age individuals in three states: employed, unemployed and not economically active (NEA). These
states are the outcome variables of the impact evaluation. We use the narrow deﬁnition of unemployed
workers, i.e. unemployed work seekers. Hence, NEA includes both the unemployed who are discouraged
work seekers and people who, for other reasons, do not enter the labour force (Kingdon and Knight, 2006;
StatSa (Statistics South Africa), 2015). This distinction is useful for our empirical analysis because allow us
to test the hypothesis that social grants support job search vis-a-vis the hypothesis that they disincentives
beneﬁciary adults engaging actively in the labour market, either by working or looking for work.
Appendix A reports some descriptive statistics for the three outcome variables and for the chosen co-
variates. The list of covariates includes gender, age, education of the working age individuals, along with
4For a detailed discussion on the progressive changes in these criteria, see d’Agostino et al. (2016)
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Figure 1: Outcome variables, by age and gender
household composition and household members receiving the OAP social grant. Districts and the provinces
where individuals live are also included in the covariate list, but not reported in the Appendix.
We conclude this Section by brieﬂy outlining the behaviour of the outcome variables (probability of
being employed, unemployed and NEA) disaggregated by age and gender. Figure 1, panel a, shows that the
probability of being employed is markedly lower for women compared with men. The gap increases by age
and becomes still more relevant for middle-age individuals. A similar behaviour is found when the probability
of being NEA is considered, in the bottom panel. Conversely, the probability of being unemployed shows a
similar behaviour for women and men.
3. Preliminary analyses
As a preliminary step, we present a falsiﬁcation test which examines whether, in a local neighbourhood of
the cutoﬀ, the number of observations below the cutoﬀ is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the number of observa-
tions above it. Figure 2, panel a, shows that we have approximately a similar density in the neighbourhood
of the 1994 cutoﬀ, even if this result changes away from it. In addition, we present a formal statistic which,
under the null hypothesis, tests if the density of the assignment variable is continuous at the cutoﬀ5. We
ﬁnd that the null hypothesis is satisﬁed (test-statistic 1.207, p-value 0.227).
5See Cattaneo et al. (2015).
5
Figure 2, panel b, shows the relationship between the assignment variable (birth cohort) and treatment
status obtained with the LP estimator. To account for diﬀering degree of exposure to the programme, we
report four LP estimations for the cases in which the individual has one, two, three or four, and ﬁve or six
beneﬁciary children. Children in birth cohorts outside the age eligibility for the CSG lay on the left of the
cutoﬀ, whereas children who are both in the treated and control groups lay on the right.
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Figure 2: Falsiﬁcation tests on the LATE assumptions
Notes: Construction of evenly spaced bins in panel b follows Calonico et al. (2014).
The ﬁgure conﬁrms the fuzzy nature of the RDD, showing that only 10% of individuals in the sample
were involved in the CSG. More interestingly, a clear self-selection emerges among the beneﬁciary household
members because the probability of entering the programme varies with the number of beneﬁciary children.
This result suggests that we have to take into account the diﬀering degrees of exposure to the programme
in the empirical investigation.
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Figure 3: Falsiﬁcation tests on the HLATE assumption
Notes: Construction of evenly spaced bins follows Calonico et al. (2014).
To complete the preliminary analysis, Figure 3 plots the probability of being treated by the CSG for
the two interaction variables identifying HLATE by gender and members of household that also receive one
or more grants from the OAP. In line with Figure 2, we distinguish among diﬀerent degrees of exposure to
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the CSG (i.e., number of beneﬁciary children in the household). As Figure 3 shows, we do not ﬁnd any
discontinuity when plotting the gender and OAP variables. This result supports the further assumption
necessary to estimate HLATE, which requires the interaction variables to be continuous at the cutoﬀ of the
assignment variable (Becker et al., 2013). The result is valid for each degree of exposure to the CSG, as
showed by the coloured lines, hence this assumption holds. Furthermore, the falsiﬁcation tests, reported in
the ﬁgure, show also the balance of gender and OAP between treated and control groups. The same structure
of falsiﬁcation tests is also applied to inspect the balance of other covariates, as reported in Appendix B.
4. Results
Tables 1, 2 and 3 summarises the results obtained with parametric IV regressions. Each of these tables
is organised horizontally in three blocks and vertically in ﬁve columns. The three blocks refer to second
order polynomial speciﬁcations of the control function6: we ﬁrst estimate the LATE and then two diﬀering
HLATE which include the gender and OAP interaction variables. The ﬁve columns present the results for
the full sample (all individual treated by the programme) and for diﬀering degrees of exposure to the CSG
(individuals classiﬁed by number of treated children). In line with the previous ﬁgures, we classify individuals
by one, two, three or four, and ﬁve or six treated children7.
The parameters reported in the ﬁrst block of each table can be interpreted in terms of the LATE, and
the parameters in the two remaining blocks in terms of the HLATE. In more detail, by introducing the
interaction term CSG x gender, we test the hypothesis that the impact of the CSG is diﬀerent for men and
women. In this case, the interaction term captures the heterogeneous eﬀect on women of being treated by the
CSG and the CSG parameter can be interpreted as the net eﬀect on outcome variables for treated women,
compared with all other units. Obviously, the same explanation can be used when the OAP is taken into
account.
In all the blocks, we test for weak instruments and report ﬁrst-stage F statistics and Wald statistics based
on the Cragg and Donald (1993)and Kleibergen and Paap (2006) generalisation to non-independently and
non-identically distributed errors, together with the p− values (Bazzi and Clemens, 2013). In blocks 2 and
3 we report also an underidentiﬁcation test based on the Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic. In addition,
all the speciﬁcations include the covariates reported in Appendix A, along with provincial8 and time ﬁxed
eﬀects, whereas the reported error terms are robust and clustered at the individual level to account for the
violation of the i.i.d in the data.
Table 1 reports the estimated results when the probability of being employed is considered. From the
ﬁrst column of the upper block, the table shows that, when we consider the full sample, we ﬁnd that the
expansion of the CSG age eligibility criterion produced a negative variation of 7.8% in the probability of
being employed, which is signiﬁcant at less than 1% level. This impact signiﬁcantly varies across the degrees
of exposure to the CSG, as showed in the remaining four columns. When only one child is treated by the
CSG, we ﬁnd an eﬀect of 2.6% on the probability of being employed, which is statistically signiﬁcant at
only 10% level. The impact increases when two beneﬁciary children and ﬁve or six beneﬁciary children are
analysed. An intermediate result is found when the group with three or four children is analysed.
More interesting results emerge from the second block of Table 1, where the heterogeneity due to gender
is analysed. The table shows that the interaction term (CSG X Gender) is always positive and statistically
signiﬁcant. When the full sample is taken into account, we ﬁnd a strong decrease (19.6%) in the probability
of being employed when the heterogeneity due to gender is considered, with a signiﬁcant level less than 1%.
This result is robust when compared with the results for the cases with two, and ﬁve or six treated children.
6Following the recent contributions by Gelman and co-authors (??), the use of high degree polynomials in the RDD can be
misleading since results based on high order polynomial regressions are sensitive to the order of the polynomial. Further, global
goodness of ﬁt measures are not good measures for choosing the order optimally, since are not closely related to the research
objective of causal inference. Following these su suggestions, we apply e a second order polynomial both in the ﬁrst and second
stage of the analysis.
7Following Becker et al. (2013), the CSG is instrumented using the ﬁt a probit auxiliary regression linked to the annual birth
cohort of each treated child in the household (Wooldridge, 2002).
8To account for diﬀerences in labour markets, we introduce provincial dummies, along with provincial linear and quadratic
trends.
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Table 1: Impact of CSG on Employment, by gender and OAP heterogeneity
Full sample Treated children
One Two Three or four Five or six
CSG -0.078 *** -0.026 * -0.069 *** -0.039 ** -0.070 **
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.029)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 60512.904 23072.198 47831.364 49342.665 21342.053
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 14001.814 2,940.502 11562.524 14448.842 1,848.400
R2 0.189 0.233 0.232 0.241 0.256
Adj. R2 0.188 0.232 0.231 0.240 0.254
No. of observations 47,895 20,181 23,972 23,419 23,754
Gender heterogeneity
CSG -0.196 *** -0.147 *** -0.199 *** -0.127 *** -0.222 ***
(0.033) (0.048) (0.039) (0.045) (0.058)
CSG X Gender 0.070 *** 0.073 *** 0.077 *** 0.052 ** 0.085 ***
(0.019) (0.027) (0.022) (0.025) (0.028)
Gender (women) -0.227 *** -0.231 *** -0.227 *** -0.228 *** -0.224 ***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 30458.956 11522.653 24000.260 24687.210 10652.769
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 6,944.982 1,404.633 5,501.775 7,003.405 927.670
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 1,731.001 2,547.761 1,887.885 905.453 263.532
Adj. R2 0.189 0.232 0.232 0.240 0.255
No. of observations 47,895 20,181 23,972 23,419 23,754
OAP heterogeneity
CSG -0.095 *** -0.026 -0.083 *** -0.056 *** -0.108 ***
(0.013) (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.032)
CSG X OAP 0.024 *** -0.000 0.017 * 0.018 ** 0.025 ***
(0.009) (0.026) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
OAP -0.037 *** -0.026 *** -0.031 *** -0.031 *** -0.032 ***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 19081.594 1,761.750 11721.728 18079.336 10719.919
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 263.609 7.768 142.148 450.321 946.367
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 119.995 40.384 155.511 161.102 269.640
Adj. R2 0.189 0.232 0.231 0.240 0.255
No. of observations 47,895 20,181 23,972 23,419 23,754
Notes: In all blocks, dependent variable is the probability of being employed (see the list of the covariates in Appendix A). The polynomial functions
are allowed to have diﬀerent parameters to the left and right of the threshold. Robust and clustered standard errors are shown in brackets. For the
second and third blocks, ﬁrst-stage regressions are probit models. Asterisks: p-value levels (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). Tests for weak and
underidentiﬁcation of the instrument F statistics and Wald statistics based on Cragg and Donald (1993) and Kleibergen and Paap (2006).
A less evident heterogeneity emerges in the bottom block of Table 1, that shows the interaction between
the CSG and OAP. We ﬁnd that for the full sample the interaction between the two social grants causes a
reduction in the probability of being employed of 9.5% (p-value < 1%). In this case, signiﬁcant results are
obtained only for the subsamples with more than one treated child. Overall, Table 1 shows that the CSG has
a strong negative impact on employment, especially when heterogeneity due to gender is taken in account.
We now consider how the CSG aﬀects the probability of beneﬁciary household members of being in the
other two labour market state. i.e. the probability of being unemployed and not economically active (NEA).
We recall that we are using the narrow deﬁnition of unemployment, which means that we consider the
unemployed actively searching for a job, whereas the category NEA includes both non-searching unemployed
and out-of-labour-force individuals. Our interest is to assess if the reduction in the probability of being
employed results in an increase in searching unemployed or NEA. In the ﬁrst case, one possible interpretation
is that the CSG, on the one hand, discourages employment, but on the other hand it relaxes the liquidity
constraints for the most deprived persons, thus increasing their probability of actively engaging in job search.
In the second case, instead, the CSG deﬁnitely discourages labour market participation.
The ﬁrst block of Table 2 shows that in the full sample the negative variation in the employment (7.8%
in the ﬁrst column of Table 1) is compensated by an increase in the population engaged in job search (6.8%,
p-value < 1%). However, when considering the heterogeneity due to gender, this eﬀect vanishes: we ﬁnd
that the reduction of 19.6% in employment (Table 1) is only partially oﬀset by an increase in the probability
of being searching unemployed (9.7%, p-value < 1%).
A similar situation is found when considering heterogeneity due to the OAP. The bottom block of the
table shows that the reduction in the probability of being employed (9.5%, p-value < 1%) is only partially
oﬀset by a positive variation in the probability of being searching unemployed (5.3%, p-value < 1%). It
is also interesting that introducing the interaction between the CSG and the OAP markedly reduces the
probability of being (searching) unemployed, with strong heterogeneity eﬀects in the diﬀering degrees of
exposure to the CSG, as showed by the remaining four columns.
Finally, Table 3, analyses the impact of the CSG on the probability of being NEA. In line with expec-
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Table 2: Impact of CSG on Unemployment, by gender and OAP heterogeneity
Full sample Treated children
One Two Three or four Five or six
CSG 0.068 *** 0.037 *** 0.060 *** 0.065 *** 0.084 ***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.023)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 63564.536 24774.411 50221.481 52013.953 24271.165
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 14097.626 2,887.357 11738.602 13769.160 3,178.525
Adj. R2 0.075 0.074 0.077 0.082 0.084
No. of observations 50,176 21,646 25,562 24,932 21,447
Gender heterogeneity
CSG 0.097 *** 0.026 0.058 ** 0.112 *** 0.177 **
(0.024) (0.031) (0.028) (0.031) (0.079)
CSG X Gender -0.018 * 0.007 0.001 -0.025 -0.011
(0.010) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.034)
Gender (women) 0.027 *** 0.020 ** 0.021 *** 0.022 *** 0.019 ***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 32017.488 12354.431 25223.096 27155.017 3,563.369
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 7,015.635 1,258.361 5,651.037 5,143.254 157.173
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 1,764.663 2,620.523 1,979.093 784.380 53.915
Adj. R2 0.074 0.074 0.077 0.082 0.075
No. of observations 50,176 21,646 25,562 30,650 19,505
OAP heterogeneity
CSG 0.053 *** 0.036 *** 0.046 *** 0.063 *** 0.118 **
(0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.050)
CSG X OAP 0.020 *** 0.002 0.017 ** 0.006 0.020 **
(0.007) (0.023) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
OAP -0.015 ** -0.009 -0.011 ** -0.004 -0.013 **
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 18261.297 1,486.027 10518.202 20722.571 3,629.250
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 259.700 7.552 130.351 700.320 159.991
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 127.859 37.288 162.654 142.627 54.909
Adj. R2 0.075 0.074 0.078 0.082 0.078
No. of observations 50,176 21,646 25,562 30,650 19,505
Notes: In all blocks, dependent variable is the probability of being unemployed (see the list of the covariates in Appendix). The polynomial functions
are allowed to have diﬀerent parameters to the left and right of the threshold. Robust and clustered standard errors are shown in brackets. For the
second and third blocks, ﬁrst-stage regressions are probit models. Asterisks: p-value levels (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). Tests for weak
and underidentiﬁcation of the instrument F statistics and Wald statistics based on Cragg and Donald (1993) and Kleibergen and Paap (2006).
tations, the ﬁrst block of the table does not show any signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, suggesting that the reduction
in the employment caused by the CSG is fully compensated by an increase in the unemployed engaged in
job search. On the contrary, when gender heterogeneity is taken into account (middle block of Table 3), a
positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact of the CSG on the probability of being NEA is found; this eﬀect
is higher when considering the heterogeneous exposure of women to the CSG (6.4%, p-value < 5%) com-
pared with the LATE estimate. A similar result is found when the interaction between the CSG and OAP
is considered, with a higher probability of being NEA (4.2%, p-value < 1%) compared with the previous
estimate.
To complete the analysis, Figure 4 shows the marginal eﬀects of the GSC on the three outcome variables
(probability of being employed, unemployed, NEA) and the corresponding conﬁdence interval for diﬀering
age cohorts, distinguishing between men and women subpopulations. To calculate the marginal eﬀects, we
used the full-sample estimates reported in Table 1, 2 and 3. For a quick interpretation of the results, we
mark with a black triangle the marginal eﬀects not statistically signiﬁcant (i.e., p-value> 10%).
A comparison among the three plots, shows that the eﬀects of the exposure to the CSG are never
statistically signiﬁcant for young individuals (people under 25 years). This result is not surprising since, in
this age range, the proportion of grant’s recipients is low. A similar result is found for the subpopulation
including the oldest individuals. In more detail, Figure 4, panel a, shows that the reduction in the probability
of being employed due to the CSG is much stronger for women compared with men, especially those in the
age range from 36 to 55, with the highest peak in the age range from 41 to 50.
When the probability of being unemployed is analysed (Figure 4, panel b), we ﬁnd a symmetrical be-
haviour of the plot but the increase in the probability of being a searching unemployed only partially oﬀsets
the reduction in employment.
The bottom panel of the ﬁgure shows the marginal eﬀect of the CSG on the probability of being NEA.
In this case, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant results for the age range from 31 to 55 when the women subpopulation is
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Table 3: Impact of CSG on NEA, by gender and OAP heterogeneity
Full-sample Treated children
One Two Three or four Five or six
CSG 0.018 0.005 0.017 0.013 0.017
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 63564.536 24774.411 42157.906 55040.331 60761.746
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 14097.626 2,887.357 9,076.951 14182.724 14999.054
Adj. R2 0.170 0.178 0.172 0.174 0.171
No. of observations 50,176 21,646 31,479 40,682 46,400
Gender heterogeneity
CSG 0.064 ** 0.073 * 0.083 *** 0.053 ** 0.063 **
(0.028) (0.041) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
CSG X Gender -0.027 * -0.041 * -0.040 ** -0.024 -0.027 *
(0.016) (0.025) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Gender (women) 0.179 *** 0.187 *** 0.185 *** 0.179 *** 0.179 ***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 32017.488 12354.431 21197.117 27665.607 30577.771
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 7,015.635 1,258.361 4,508.248 7,013.871 7,438.495
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 1,764.663 2,620.523 2,214.440 1,809.332 1,728.419
Adj. R2 0.170 0.178 0.172 0.174 0.171
No. of observations 50,176 21,646 31,479 40,682 46,400
OAP heterogeneity
CSG 0.042 *** 0.001 0.046 *** 0.013 0.078 **
(0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.020) (0.036)
CSG X OAP -0.034 *** 0.010 -0.027 ** -0.013 -0.035 ***
(0.010) (0.033) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
OAP 0.040 *** 0.029 *** 0.036 *** 0.028 *** 0.034 ***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 18261.297 1,486.027 10518.202 16743.823 11593.146
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 259.700 7.552 130.351 448.096 890.455
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 127.859 37.288 162.654 177.566 245.107
Adj.R2 0.170 0.178 0.177 0.189 0.185
No. of observations 50,176 21,646 25,562 24,932 25,223
Notes: In all blocks, dependent variable is the probability of being NEA (see the list of the covariates in Appendix A). The polynomial functions are
allowed to have diﬀerent parameters to the left and right of the threshold. Robust and clustered standard errors are shown in brackets. For the second
and third blocks, ﬁrst-stage regressions are probit models. Asterisks: p-value levels (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). Tests for weak and
underidentiﬁcation of the instrument F statistics and Wald statistics based on Cragg and Donald (1993) and Kleibergen and Paap (2006).
analysed, and for the age range from 41 to 60 for the male subpopulation. In contrast to the previous plot,
the probability of being NEA is higher for men, especially in the age range from 46 to 50.
5. Robustness
In this Section, we provide further evidence on the internal validity of the RDD and inspect the external
validity of the design.
First, not all households with a child in the eligible age range receive the CSG, since they must also meet
an eligibility requirement based on income means test, and this criterion has changed over time. A selection
bias may therefore emerge if we do not take into account how participation in the programme varies with
changes in the income requirement. The database does not allow us to examine these changes explicitly.
In addition, since households may manipulate their income to satisfy the eligibility criterion, the internal
validity assumption may be violated. To overcome these shortcomings, following van der Klaauw (2002), a
two-step propensity score (PS) procedure was applied (d’Agostino et al., 2016).
Another concern is that, when households have more than one treated child, a self-selection bias may
arise as caregivers, or other members, are already familiar to the programme hence their experience increases
the probability of assignment to it. To account for self-selection when individuals are members of households
receiving more than one grants from the CSG, we introduce a Chamberlainian’s control for individual ﬁxed
eﬀects (?) in the second-stage analysis. When neither the income requirement nor the self-selection bias
aﬀect the estimated results, no signiﬁcant diﬀerence is found between the two-step PS and the IV estimates.
Secondly, the external validity of the evaluation requires the outcomes for the treated and non-treated
populations away from the cutoﬀ to be constant (d’Agostino et al., 2016). To check whether the external
validity assumption holds, we analyse the constancy of the LATE and HLATE for birth cohorts away from
the 1994 cutoﬀ by comparing the results obtained through the IV estimator with those through the IDW
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Figure 4: Marginal eﬀects of CSG on outcome variables, by age: men and women subpopulations
Notes: Black triangle indicates marginal eﬀects not statistically signiﬁcant (i.e., p-value> 10%).
estimator9. Since the IDW provides higher weights for cohorts near the cutoﬀ, if the LATE and HLATE are
constant, we do not expect any signiﬁcant diﬀerences between IDW and IV estimates.
The results of these analyses are presented in Table 5. The table is organised horizontally in three
blocks and vertically in six columns. The three blocks refer to third-order polynomial speciﬁcations of the
control function: we ﬁrst estimate the LATE and then two HLATE estimates considering the gender and
OAP interaction variables, respectively. The six columns present the results for each labour market state,
distinguishing between the IDW and the PS estimates.
Looking at the table, we ﬁnd that the RDD results have both strong internal and external validity as, in
the majority of cases, the parameters estimated with the IDW and PS methods are contained in the same
conﬁdence intervals of the IV estimates. The only divergences concern the PS estimate of the employment’s
probability (ﬁrst block, 7%, p-value < 1%), which is lower than the one estimated in Table 1 (), and the PS
estimate of the HLATE, when accounting for the impact of the CSG on the probability of being NEA by
gender (6.4%). In the latter case, we ﬁnd that the parameter is signiﬁcant only at 10% level.
9For an application of this approach, see, for example, Pieroni and Salmasi (2015).
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Table 4: Robustness checks
Employed Unemployed (searching) NEA
IDW PS IDW PS IDW PS
Child support grant -0.078 *** -0.070 *** 0.068 *** 0.068 *** 0.018 0.017
(0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 60464.775 63514.708 63514.708
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 13983.139 14079.495 14079.495
Adj. R2 0.188 0.189 0.075 0.075 0.170 0.170
No. of observations 47,895 47,895 50,176 50,176 50,176 50,176
Gender heterogeneity
CSG -0.196 *** -0.192 *** 0.097 *** 0.104 *** 0.064 ** 0.064 *
(0.033) (0.043) (0.024) (0.029) (0.028) (0.036)
CSG X Gender 0.070 *** 0.072 *** -0.018 * -0.022 * -0.027 * -0.028
(0.019) (0.023) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020)
Gender (women) -0.227 *** -0.222 *** 0.027 *** 0.021 *** 0.179 *** 0.178 ***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 30434.932 31992.609 31992.609
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 6,936.012 7,006.826 7,006.826
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 1,731.603 1,765.318 1,765.318
Adj. R2 0.189 0.190 0.074 0.075 0.170 0.170
No. of observations 47,895 47,895 50,176 50,176 50,176 50,176
OAP heterogeneity
CSG -0.095 *** -0.087 *** 0.053 *** 0.054 *** 0.042 *** 0.040 **
(0.013) (0.018) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017)
CSG X OAP 0.024 *** 0.022 *** 0.020 *** 0.017 *** -0.034 *** -0.029 ***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008)
OAP -0.037 *** -0.033 *** -0.015 ** -0.010 *** 0.040 *** 0.032 ***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 19076.170 18257.807 18257.807
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic 263.612 259.713 259.713
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 120.072 127.935 127.935
Adj. R2 0.189 0.189 0.075 0.076 0.170 0.171
No. of observations 47,895 47,895 50,176 50,176 50,176 50,176
Notes: See the list of the selected covariates in Appendix. The polynomial functions are allowed to have diﬀerent parameters to the left and right of the threshold.
Robust and clustered standard errors are shown in brackets. For the second and third blocks, ﬁrst-stage regressions are probit models. Asterisks: p-value levels
(∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). Tests for weak and underidentiﬁcation of the instrument F statistics and Wald statistics based on Cragg and Donald (1993)
and Kleibergen and Paap (2006).
6. Conclusions
This paper estimates the impact of the South African CSG on the employment status of the adult
members of beneﬁciary households. We use the dataset provided by the NIDS covering 2008, 2010-2011
and 2012 and carry out a fuzzy RDD to estimate the LATE. We also identify how the eﬀect of the CSG
varies with the number of treated children in beneﬁciary households. In addition, we capture two sources of
heterogeneity across units in the impact of the CSG on labour market, i.e. gender and household members
receiving the OAP social grant.
Our evaluation shows that the CSG had a negative eﬀect on the probability of being employed for the
adult members of beneﬁciary households. This negative eﬀect was particularly strong for women, and it
worsened when households received beneﬁts for more than one child. Similarly, the negative eﬀect was
stronger for members of households receiving both the CSG and the OAP. Overall, these results suggest
that the CSG had perverse incentives on the behaviour of the adult members of beneﬁciary households and
caused signiﬁcant ”grant dependence”, especially in women, thus increasing gender inequality in the labour
market.
Some policy implications are drawn from this analysis. First, establishing a ﬂat transfer of appropriate
size, not tailored according to the composition of the beneﬁciary family, would be useful to avoid distortions
in the household decisions, especially of women, related to labour supply. Secondly, the eligibility criteria
on the basis of the income means test should esplicitly take into account other social grants received by the
household members, in particular the OAP, and a better monitoring over time would be necessary. Lastly, the
government should intervene directly by reducing labour market failures and improving welfare provisioning
to tackle gender inequality and structural poverty, instead of following the strategy of increasing the CSG
coverage.
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics
Mean Standard deviation
Employed 0.38 0.49
Unemployed 0.15 0.36
Not economically active 0.32 0.47
Gender
women 1.65 0.48
Age 35.99 12.59
Degree of education
No schooling 0.11 0.31
Primary 0.17 0.37
Secondary 0.66 0.47
Tertiary 0.07 0.26
Old Age Pension
0.27 0.45
Number of children
No children 0.02 0.14
One child 0.12 0.32
Two children 0.22 0.41
Three children 0.21 0.41
Four children 0.16 0.37
Five to nine children 0.25 0.43
More than 9 children 0.02 0.13
Number of residents
1-4 0.18 0.38
5-9 0.60 0.49
10-14 0.19 0.39
15+ 0.04 0.20
Race
African 0.80 0.40
Coloured 0.16 0.36
Others 0.04 0.20
Geographical location
Urban 0.44 0.50
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Appendix B: Falsiﬁcation tests on the balance of selected covariates
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